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The State of Washington has allowed treble. damages for willful
conversion of fruit trees.'.
In summary, Barnes v. Moore places Virginia in accord with
the view of the majority concerning damages for timber tres-
pass as exemplified by the Restatement and the Wooden Ware
case views. It is submitted that in future cases, whenever a tres-
pass resulting from an intentional or grossly negligent act is in-
volved, consideration be given to the benefits obtainable from the
utilization of the Virginia treble damage statutes.
H. D. M.
TORTS-LIBEL AND SLANDER
The incredible judicial inertia,' which has existed since the
sixteenth century 2 in regard to the alleged distinction between
libel and slander,3 has been overcome at long last in the recent
New York case of Shor v. Billingsley.4 An action for defamation
was instituted on the basis of certain interpolations, disparaging
to the plaintiff, made by the defendant on his television show.
The statements upon which this action was predicated were as
follows:
"Mr. Billingsley: Yes, he (Plaintiff) is. Want to know
something? I wish I had as much money as he owes."
"Mr. Birsson: Owes you or somebody else?"
"Mr. Billingsley: Everybody-oh, a lot of people." 5
Defendant's main contentions were that there was no def-
14 Lawson v. Helmich et al., 146 P.2d 537 (1944).
1 Prosser on Torts, Ch. 19, 93, pp. 595-596 (2nd Ed.) (1955).2 Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 41
L.Q.Rev. 13 (1925); Holdsworth, Defamation in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries, 40 L.Q.Rev. 302 (1924).
3"Libel was originally written defamation, while slander was oral; the
present tendency is to make the distinction on the basis of permanence
of form, or potentiality of harm, similar to writing or printing"
Prosser on Torts, Ch. 19, 593, pp. 584-596 (2nd Ed.) (1955).
4 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (1956) on Reargument, Jan. 8, 1957.
5 Ibid. at 478.
amation in the above statement for it would be no idle wish that
one had as much money as some of our 20th century financial
wizards would owe on any given date; that even if the statement
did constitute defamation, they sounded in slander and allegations
and proof of special damages are required; and that the court
was without precedent or authority that the statements consti-
tuted libel, such authority being vested in the legislature.
The real problem of the case was to determine whether the
action sounded in libel or in slander. This precise question,
whether interpolations, defamatory in nature, made on a tele-
vision show are libelous or slanderous, had never before been
passed upon in either the New York courts or in any other juris-
diction.
The court in the instant case, relying heavily on the "dicta"
contained in the concurring opinion of Fuld, J., in Hartman v.
Winchell,6 held that it was for the jury to determine if the state-
ments were defamatory; that they could not say as a matter
of law that the statements were not defamatory. They were also
of the opinion that, regardless of the lack of precedent for holding
such statements libelous, "courts sometimes of necessity abandon
their search for precedents, and yet sustain a recovery upon legal
principles clearly applicable to the new state of facts, although
there is no direct precedent for it, because there had never been
an occasion to make one." '7 In disposing of the contention that
the legislature alone could apply the law of libel, the court
stated:
Legislative action there could, of course, be, but we
abdicate our own function, in a field peculiarly non-
statutory, when we refuse to reconsider an old and un-
satisfactory court-made rule... The common law does
not go on the theory that a case of first impression pre-
6296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E.2d 30, 171 A.L.R. 759 (1947) wherein he stated:
'TBroadcasting defamatory matter which has not been reduced to writ-
ing should be held libelous because of the potentially harrrful and
widespread effects of such-defamation and because of the likelihood of
aggravated injury inherent in such broadcasting."
7 Kuzek v. Goldman, 150 N.Y. 176, 178, 44 NE. 773, 774, 34 L.R.A. 156
(1896).
sents a problem of legislative as opposed to judicial
power.8
Thus the court found that the interpolations were libel rather
than slander.
The history of the development of defamation, which is
made up of the twin torts of libel and slander, has been erratic,
following no particular aim or plan, with, in many instances, lit-
tle rhyme or reason.9 Libel was originally written defamation
and was actionable without proof that damage had occurred.10
Originally, slander was oral defamation and was not actionable
without proof of actual damage. To this the courts very early
established certain specific exceptions: the imputation of crime,
a loathsome disease, or unchastity to a woman, or imputations
affecting the plaintiff in his trade, business, profession, office, or
calling. In the development of libel, with the carving out of ex-
ceptions and with the extensions which crept into the law, the
distinction became a question of whether the defamatory state-
ment was embodied in some more or less permanent form. To-
day courts distinguish between defamation which is libel per se
and that which is libel per quod,"x requiring of the latter proof of
actual damage.
The advent of new means of communication served to fur-
ther the complexity which had already arisen. Courts found
little difficulty in applying the law of libel to motion pictures,
8 Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 344, 355-356, 102 NaE.2d 691, 694, 27 A.L.R.2d
1250 (1951). And see Funk v. U.S., 290 U.S. 371, 54 S.Ct. 212, 78
LEd. 369 (1933); Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 NaE.2d 254, 123
A.L.R. 1015 (1939); Hazopian v. Samuelson, 236 App.Div. 491, 260
N.YS. 24 (1932).
9 See Donnelly, History of Defamation, f1949) Wis.L.Rev. 99; Holdsworth,
Defamation in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 1924, 40 L.Q.
Rev. 302, 41 L.Q.Rev. 13; Carr, The English Law of Defamation, 1902,
18 L.Q.Rev. 255, 388; Courtney, Absurdities of the Law of Slander and
Libel, 1902, 36 Am.L.Rev. 552.
10 This represents the English and American minority view. And see Re-
statement of Torts, 5569.
"1 This represents the American majority view and these courts treat libel
as slander for the purpose of determining whether proof of actual dam-
ages is a necessary prerequisite to recovery. See Ilitzy v. Goodman,
57 Ariz. 216, 112 P.2d 860 (1941); Felix v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273; 52
A.2d 976 (1947); Chase v. New Mexico Pub. Co., 53 N.M. 145, 203
P.2d 594 (1949).
the sound tract being so closely identified with the film itself.'2
However, violent debate still exists as to defamation by radio'3
with some courts holding it to be libel, 14 with at least one hold-
ing it to be slander,' 5 with one holding it libelous if read from a
script but slanderous if not,'6 and with others regarding it as
somewhere in between libel and slander.' 7 Attempts at regula-
tion by statute have shown similar disagreement, some treating
the defamation as libel,'8 others as slander,19 and others as both.20
It is hoped that much discussion will be attendant upon this
decision. As has been pointed out by Professor Prosser,2 one
reason the law in this area has remained unchanged so long is that
'there has been a violent dispute as to the direction in which it
should move. This has, in part, accounted for the judicial iner-
tia, for the law is in the main conservative, as are the members of
the bench, and movement solely for the purpose of movement is
a poor substitute for the consistent inconsistencies of gradual
evolution through exceptions to settled rules. Four major pro-
posals have been advanced to reconcile libel and slander in terms
of Twentieth Century existence:
IaYoussoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 99 A.L.R. 864 (1934); Oklahoma
Pub. Co. v. Givens, C.C.A. 10th Cir., 67 F.2d 62 (1933); Kelly v.
Loew's, 76 F.Supp. 473 (1948).
's Vold, The Basis for Liability for Defamation by Radio, 19 Minn.L.Rev.
611 (1935); Vold, Defamatory Interpolations in Radio Broadcasts, 88
U.Pa.L.Rev. 249 (1940); Newhouse, Defamation by Radio: A New Tort,
17 Ok.L.Rev. 314 (1939); Graham, Defamation and Radio, 24 Minn.
L.Rev. 118 (1939); Donnelly, Defamation by Radio, a Reconsideration,
34 Iowa L.Rev. 12 (1948); Notes, 1946, Harv.L.Rev. 133; 1947, 33
Va.L.Rev. 612; 1941, 39 Mich.L.Rev. 1002.
14 Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932); Coffey v. Midland
Broadcasting Co., 8 F.Supp. 889 (1934). The English Defamation Act
of 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. VI & Eliz. II, c. 66, cl. 1-2, makes radio defama-
tion libel.
15 Melcrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., 1932, Vict.L.Rep. 425, (1932),
Austl.Rep. 452.
16 Hartman v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 NE.2d 30 (1947); Hryhoriejev
v. Winchell, 180 Misc. 574, 45 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1943).
'7Summit Hotel Co. v. N. B. Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1939); Kelly
v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 142 (1948).
I8 Illinois S.H.A. Ch. 38, § §404.1 to 404.4; Wash.Rev.Stat. Ann., Remington
Supp. 1940, §§2424, 2427.
19 California Civ. Code, §46; North Dakota N.D.R.C. 1943, 12-2815.
20 Florida F.S.A. §770.03; Int.Stat, Burn's Ann.St. §2.518; Mont.Rev.Code,
1939 Supp., c. 3A, §5694.1.21 Prosser on Torts, Ch. 19, §93, pp. 595-596 (2nd Ed.) (1955).
1. To require in all cases, proof of actual damage as es-
sential to the existence of a cause of action;22
2. To. make all defamation, oral or written, actionable
without proof of damage;zs
3. To distinguish upon the basis of the extent of pub-
lication;
4. To distinguish between minor and major defamatory
imputations, having regard to all extrinsic facts, and
to make only the latter actionable without proof of
damage.
Professor Prosser predicted as early as 194124 that a combination
of the last two proposals seems "most likely to be adopted." 25
The New York Court has done just this, recognizing that "if
considerations of principles are to control, there is no valid rea-
son why the same consequences should not attach to publication
through the medium of radio broadcasting (and television) as
flow from publication through the medium of writing." 26
Although the court in the instant case did not overrule the
Hartmann case, supra, since the question of radio broadcasting
was not properly before it, there is little doubt that the present
decision could be a precedent for the adoption of the same or a
similar rule in respect thereof. Both radio and television reach
audiences greater by far than those of newspapers and the injury
capable of infliction is, thus, at least as great if not greater.
The New York Court, recognizing that "the law went
wrong from the beginning in making the damage and not the
insult the cause of action",27 has adopted the philosophy of Judge
Cardozo: 28
22 Publishers are extremely favorable to this proposal.
23 This is the law in Louisiana. It is also the law in Scotland, and by Stat-
ute in Queensland and New South Wales and has been adopted in
Alberta and Manitoba by recognition of the Canadian Uniform Act.
24 Prosser on Torts, Ch. 19, §92, pp. 807-809 (1941).
25 Ibid. at 809. The French Law substantially conforms to this and has
since May 17, 1819.
26 Hartmarm v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 306, 73 N.E.2d 30, 34, 171 A.L.R.
759 (1947).
27 Pollock, Law of Torts- 13th Ed., 243, 249 (1929).
28 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 291, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053,
L.R.A. 1916 F, 696 (1916).
Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stagecoach
do not fit the conditions of travel today.
Whether other jurisdictions will follow the lead of New York is
problematical, but almost any action after such long inaction
would be welcome.
N. A. C.
TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A
MATTER OF LAW
The final judgment in one of the few inharmonious decisions
to come from the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia this
year and one which reflects the consequences and inherent dan-
gers of an appellate court sitting as reviewers of jury conclusions
of fact, makes Simmons v. Craig1 an important case to the prac-
tic'ng attorney in the negligence field.
Craig initiated an action in the Circuit Court of Roanoke
County against Simmons for damages suffered in an automobile
collision occasioned by the alleged negligence of Simmons who
was driving at night without lights on his vehicle. Judgment
was entered in the lower court in favor of Craig on the findings
of the jury. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed
the decision in favor of Simmons, two judges dissenting.
Two errors were of concern to the court in justification of
the appeal; the two questions raised being:
1. Was Simmons guilty of any actionable negligence?
2. Was Craig guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law?
One mile east of Vinton, Virginia, a collision occurred at a
late twilight hour and during a heavy rainstorm. Simmons was
driving westwardly toward town and Craig was following an
unidentified motor vehicle going east on Route 24. Simmons' tes-
timony placed his speed at 20 miles per hour while Craig claimed
to have been travelling at a speed of 25 miles per hour just prior
1 199 Va. 338 (1957).
